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INTRINSIC IMBALANCE:  
THE IMPACT OF INCOME DISPARITY ON 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ* 
When I was young I thought that money was the most important thing in life; now that 
I am old I know that it is.  
Oscar Wilde 
 
From an administrative law standpoint, what, if anything, distinguishes 
financial regulation from other forms of regulation? In part, the answer is 
complexity; financial products and markets are already highly complex and 
becoming increasingly more so.1 But this is only a partial answer because other 
regulatory spheres, such as environmental and nuclear regulation, can be at 
least as complex as financial regulation. 
This article argues that what further, and more tellingly, distinguishes 
financial regulation from other forms of regulation is the extraordinary income 
disparity between regulators and industry employees.2 This income disparity—
coupled with the complexity of financial products and markets—creates an 
“information asymmetry”3 between regulators and industry that can lead to 
regulatory failure: the inability of regulators to fully understand, and thus to 
effectively monitor and regulate, financial innovations that might create 
systemic externalities. 
Part I of this article demonstrates that there is at least a two-to-one income 
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  1.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 
212–13 (2009) (observing that complexity is “the greatest financial-market challenge of the future”). 
 2.  This article focuses on the income disparity, or gap, between individuals with relatively similar 
backgrounds in terms of education and experience. It does not focus on the overall distribution of 
income, nor does it focus on earning disparities between individuals with different backgrounds. 
 3.  This article uses the term “information asymmetry” broadly, to include an asymmetry in the 
processing of information. Economists sometimes use the term “information asymmetry” more 
narrowly, confining it to facts; in that more narrow sense, an information asymmetry would exist only if 
one party were to have more or better information than another party (regardless of either party’s 
ability to process the information). 
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disparity between financial industry employees and their regulatory 
counterparts. Part II of the article argues that this income disparity makes it 
difficult for financial regulatory agencies to hire competitively, thereby creating 
an information asymmetry between regulators and industry. Part III examines 
the adverse consequences of that information asymmetry to administrative-
agency rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. Finally, part IV of the article 
discusses potential responses to the income disparity (and resulting information 
asymmetry). 
This article focuses on financial regulation by administrative agencies. 
Legislative bodies typically delegate power to administrative agencies to 
implement statutory law through agency rulemaking, monitoring, and 
enforcement of compliance. The income disparity discussed in this article is a 
disparity between the incomes of administrative agency financial regulators and 
the incomes of employees in the financial industry being regulated. 
To some extent, the income disparity is driven by administrative-agency 
budgets. Were a budget its only limit, an agency might have the flexibility to 
choose between hiring a smaller number of higher-income employees or a 
larger number of lower-income employees. In practice, however, this flexibility 
is somewhat limited. Some administrative-agency incomes are subject to per-
person maximum compensation caps.4 Moreover, an agency’s need for some 
minimum number of employees ultimately limits its ability to hire a smaller 
number of higher-income employees.5 
I 
THE INCOME DISPARITY 
It is generally recognized that there is an income disparity between 
government regulators and private-sector employees in regulated industries. 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics surveys indicate, for example, that federal 
government pay is around twenty-five percent lower than private-sector pay for 
similar jobs.6 This is mainly because federal government workers are typically 
 
 4.  See infra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See, e.g., infra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (discussing the large number of regulatory 
personnel needed to pursue enforcement actions); cf. William Alden, For 2 Wall Street Regulators, 
More Belt-Tightening, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/for-2-wall-
street-regulators-more-belt-tightening/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (reporting that under 
Congress’s restricted new budget proposal, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission “would 
probably not reach [its] goal” of hiring “an additional 676 workers in 2014”). 
 6.  Gregory B. Lewis & Sue A. Frank, Who Wants to Work for the Government?, 62 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 395, 396 (2002) (discussing the income disparity generally between the public and private sector 
for similar jobs). Lewis and Frank also state that “economists typically find that similar workers (those 
of the same race and sex with the same levels of education and experience) earn much more in the 
federal than in the private sector . . . .” Id. If those economists’ findings are accurate, the impact of the 
income disparity between the public and the private sector may be even more pronounced for financial 
jobs than for nonfinancial jobs because federal government pay would be more comparable to private-
sector pay for similar jobs generally, whereas it would still be more than fifty percent lower than 
private-sector pay for similar financial jobs. Cf. infra note 33 and accompanying text (making a 
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paid in accordance with the general schedule or the executive schedule as 
overseen by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management.7 For each pay grade, 
there is a maximum compensation cap.8 Thus, the “public sector is not usually 
able to compete with the salaries offered by private employers, especially those 
of highly educated personnel and managers.”9 
A much larger income disparity exists, however, between financial 
regulators and private-sector employees of the financial industry. This disparity 
can be demonstrated by comparing the incomes of representative financial 
industry workers and government regulators. The U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports, for example, that entry-level investment bankers, who are 
categorized as financial analysts, had a median annual salary of $90,560 in 2012 
and a mean annual salary of $111,650.10 Higher-level investment bankers, who 
are categorized as financial managers, earned an average annual salary of 
$160,900.11 These figures represent salaries but do not account for options and 
bonuses, which are a prevalent form of additional compensation in the financial 
industry.12 Wall Street bonuses averaged $138,970 in 2010.13 Even entry-level 
investment bankers, with only bachelor’s degrees, earned an average bonus of 
$55,000 in 2013.14 
 
comparison based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey data). 
 7.  Federal Salary Act of 1967, 5 U.S.C. § 5332 (2006) (“The General Schedule is a schedule of 
annual rates of basic pay, consisting of 15 grades, designated ‘GS-1’ through ‘GS-15’, consecutively, 
with 10 rates of pay for each such grade.”); see also OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT, SALARY TABLE 
2013-GS (2013), available at http://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-
wages/2013/general-schedule/gs.pdf. 
 8.  5 U.S.C. § 5333 (2006).  
New appointments shall be made at the minimum rate of the appropriate grade. However, . . . 
[under certain enumerated circumstances] the head of an agency may appoint, with the 
approval of the Office in each specific case, an individual to a position at such a rate above the 
minimum rate of the appropriate grade . . . . 
Id. 
 9.  KIRSI ÄIJÄLÄ, THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. PUB. MGMT. SERV., PUBLIC 
SECTOR—AN EMPLOYER OF CHOICE? REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVE EMPLOYER PROJECT 29 
(2001). 
 10.  Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial Investments and Related Activities: 
NAICS 523, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag523.htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2014). 
 11.  May 2012 National Industry-Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates NAICS 
523900 – Other Financial Investment Activities, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR, http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics4_523900.htm (last visited Sep. 26, 2014). 
 12.  See OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, NEW YORK SECURITIES INDUSTRY BONUS POOL 
(2013), available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/feb13/avgbonus.pdf (listing the average 
bonuses given to Wall Street employees annually). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See Brian DeChesare, 2013 Investment Banking Bonuses: Is “Flat” Better Than Nonexistent?, 
MERGERS & INQUISITIONS, http://www.mergersandinquisitions.com/2013-investment-banking-
bonuses/. For the bonuses of non-top-tier firms, around $10,000 needs to be subtracted. Id.; cf. 
Investment Banking: Salaries, CAREERS-IN-BUSINESS.COM, http://www.careers-in-
finance.com/ibsal.htm (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (reporting that bonuses for first-year private-sector 
financial analysts ranged between $20,000 and $40,000 in 2013). 
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Contrast these figures with public-sector salary data for reasonably 
comparable jobs. Although the maximum compensation cap15 does not apply to 
many federal financial regulatory agencies,16 those agencies are still limited by 
budgetary constraints.17 As a result, entry-level financial employees of the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are paid only between $39,094 and 
$58,904 in base salary.18 Entry-level employees at federal banking regulatory 
agencies are paid comparable salaries.19 This contrasts with the twice-as-high 
salaries of entry-level private-sector financial analysts.20 
The compensation differential between more-senior public-sector jobs and 
private-sector financial jobs might appear to be smaller: the FDIC, for example, 
might pay a senior financial analyst an initial salary of up to $153,000,21 
compared to the $160,900 average salary paid to private-sector financial 
managers.22 However, that differential is almost certainly larger for two reasons: 
first, the quoted FDIC salary is a maximum and not an average;23 and second, in 
addition to salary, huge bonuses are prevalent in the financial industry,24 
 
 15.  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 16.  Some federal financial regulatory agencies are statutorily permitted to set their own pay 
schedule and therefore are able to offer salaries that exceed the limits of the general schedule. Thus, 
the Federal Reserve System, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Office of Thrift 
Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union Administration, 
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) are exempt from those limits, although each such 
agency is still subject to its own internal limits. See, e.g., 2013 FDIC Base Salary Structures, FED. 
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www.fdic.gov/about/jobs/2013cgcmcxem.pdf (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) 
(listing FDIC pay scale); 2014 FR Salary Structures, FED. RESERVE BOARD, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/careers/salary.htm (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (listing Federal Reserve 
Board pay scale); Salaries, OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/about/who-
we-are/careers/salaries.html (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (listing OCC pay scale); 5 U.S.C. § 4802 
(exempting the SEC from compensation limits). For the SEC, no pay plan was publicly available. 
 17.  See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 18.  See SEC Pay Structure: Base Pay Ranges, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/jobs/sec-pay.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter SEC Pay Structure] (listing 
the minimum and maximum for SK-7 level employees (effective Jan. 26, 2014)). SK-7 level employees 
include entry-level examiners with a bachelor’s degree in finance or business. Opportunities for 
Examiners with the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/jobs/examiners.htm (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015) [hereinafter Opportunities for Examiners with the SEC]. These figures do not 
account for a supplementary geographical pay that can be higher, including 30.74% higher for New 
York City. See SEC Pay Structure, supra note 18. 
 19.  See Opportunities for Examiners with the SEC, supra note 18. 
 20.  See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 21.  See, e.g., Senior Financial Analyst, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, 
https://www.usajobs.gov/JobSearch/Search/GetResults?OrganizationID=FD00&ApplicantEligibility=
All (last visited Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Senior Financial Analyst] (indicating the high end of the base 
salary range offered for this type of FDIC position). 
 22.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. I could not corroborate, however, the extent to 
which public-sector senior policy analysts and private-sector financial managers are perfectly 
comparable jobs. 
 23.  The low end of the base salary range offered for that type of senior FDIC position, for 
example, is in the $93,000 range. See Senior Financial Analyst, supra note 21. 
 24.  See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
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whereas bonuses are rare and smaller in size within the public sector.25 Thus, the 
real comparison of the senior public-sector salary may be to a senior private-
sector compensation of $299,870.26 If that comparison is accurate,27 it again 
represents at least a twice-as-high compensation of the private sector over the 
public sector for financial jobs. 
This approximately two-to-one private-sector compensation advantage is 
mirrored in all of the available data (except at the top compensation levels, 
where the private sector’s compensation advantage spirals even higher28). For 
example, private-sector financial examiners who “ensure compliance with laws 
and regulations governing financial and securities institutions and financial and 
real estate transactions” earn a mean annual salary of $86,980,29 whereas public-
sector financial examiners performing the same type of work earn only $50,000 
annually.30 Moreover, the two-to-one advantage shown by the data is probably 
conservative because the data reflect the recent post–financial crisis recession 
period,31 whereas private-sector compensation for financial jobs increases even 
 
 25.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PUBLIC MANAGEMENT OCCASIONAL PAPERS 
NO. 15: PERFORMANCE PAY SCHEMES FOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGERS: AN EVALUATION OF THE 
IMPACTS (1997). Although no law limits the number of size of bonuses that can be paid to federal 
agency workers, the appropriateness of bonuses are judged by agency heads and overseen by Congress. 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EXECUTIVE BONUSES: INFORMATION ON FDIC’S AND RTC’S 
EXECUTIVE BONUS PROGRAMS 2 (1993), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/220/218721.pdf. 
Indeed, another source suggests that a representative bonus for an FDIC senior financial analyst may 
be in the $5,000 range. See FDIC Senior Financial Analyst Salary, GLASSDOOR.COM, 
http://www.glassdoor.com/Salary/FDIC-Senior-Financial-Analyst-Salaries-E18376_D_KO5,29.htm (last 
visited Dec. 8, 2014); see generally OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
2008 AUDIT OF SENSITIVE PAYMENTS (2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/oig/reportspubs/ 
final_sensitive_payments_report.pdf (auditing 2008 compensation, including bonuses, of high level SEC 
staff). 
 26.  This figure is the sum of the $160,900 average salary paid to private-sector financial managers, 
see supra note 22 and accompanying text, and the $138,970 average private-sector bonus, see supra note 
13 and accompanying text. 
 27.  Anecdotal evidence collected by the U.S. General Accounting Office suggests that comparison 
is generally correct, at least for the compensation differential between public-sector SEC jobs and 
private-sector equivalent jobs. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION: HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES REQUIRE MANAGEMENT ATTENTION 2, 6 (2001), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/232683.pdf) (reporting that “SEC officials, who are aware of 
the significance of this [compensation differential] issue, told us that the SEC staff often make fifty 
percent less than employees in comparable positions in the private sector . . . .”). 
 28.  For example, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve receives an annual salary of $201,700, see 
FAQ on Selection of Federal Reserve Board Members, FED. RESERVE BOARD (Jan. 31, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about_12591.htm, whereas the CEO of Bank of America earned an 
annual salary of $1.5 million and, with the addition of options and bonuses, received $24.8 million in 
total compensation, see Big Bank Execs: What They Take Home, CNN.COM, 
http://money.cnn.com/news/specials/storysupplement/ceopay/ (last visited Sep. 24, 2014) (reporting on 
2007 compensation). 
 29.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND 
WAGES, MAY 2013, available at http://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes132061.htm. 
 30.  OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, ENTRY-LEVEL BANK EXAMINERS, 
available at http://www.occ.gov/about/who-we-are/careers/entry-level-bank-examiner.html. 
 31.  All of this article’s private-sector financial-job compensation data come from the period 2010–
2013. See supra notes 10, 11, 13, 14, & 29 and accompanying text. 
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more during financial booms.32 
Thus, although federal government pay is around twenty-five percent lower 
than private-sector pay for similar jobs generally,33 it appears to be more than 
fifty percent lower than private-sector pay for similar financial jobs. 
II 
THE RESULTING INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
This huge income disparity, in which financial regulators earn only (and 
perhaps less than) half the income of members of the financial industry, makes 
it difficult for regulatory agencies to hire competitively compared to industry. 
As explained below, that, in turn, creates an information asymmetry between 
the two groups. 
A. The Income Disparity Makes it Difficult for Regulatory Agencies To Hire 
Because of the income disparity, regulatory agencies cannot hire 
competitively compared to the financial industry.34 Consider, for example, the 
SEC’s staffing crisis, which is “primarily due to [an] inability to compensate 
[SEC] employees adequately.”35 With “few exceptions, departing [SEC] 
employees overwhelmingly cite[d] the higher salaries offered by private sector 
firms as their primary reason for resigning.”36 Salary was also cited as the major 
reason for prospective employees declining SEC employment offers.37 Other 
studies have confirmed this government-salary problem, finding that “too many 
of the best recruits are rethinking their commitment, either because they are fed 
up with the constraints of outmoded personnel systems and unmet expectation 
for advancement or simply lured away by the substantial difference between 
public and private sector salaries in many areas.”38 
Other things being equal, people choosing between employment offers will 
 
 32.  Philip Bond & Vincent Glode, The Labor Market for Bankers and Regulators 27 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2539, 2557–60, 2567–68 (2014) (finding that during financial booms, financial firms “poach” the 
best regulatory workers by offering even greater compensation). 
 33.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The above comparison may even understate the 
relative impact of the income disparity for financial jobs. See supra note 6. 
 34.  See, e.g., Camelia M. Kuhnen, Searching for Jobs: Evidence from MBA Graduates 25–27 
(Working Paper, March 2011), available at http://public.kenan-flagler.unc.edu/faculty/kuhnenc/ 
RESEARCH/Kuhnen_SearchingForJobs_030411.pdf (noting that, in general, candidates with higher 
ability self-select into higher paying jobs). 
 35.  Pay Parity Implementation Plan and Report, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, (Mar. 6, 2002), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/payparity.htm (“Public Service always entails an element of sacrifice 
on the part of government employees.”). 
 36.  Id.; accord U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 27, at 6 (“By an overwhelming 
majority, current and former SEC attorneys, accountants and examiners we surveyed cited 
compensation as their primary reason for leaving the SEC.”). 
 37.  U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 35. 
 38.  THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE PUB. SERV., URGENT BUSINESS FOR AMERICA: REVITALIZING 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 8 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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select the offer paying twice as much as alternatives.39 Next, examine whether, 
in choosing between employment by a public-sector regulator and a private-
sector firm, other things are truly equal. 
There are two relevant frameworks by which to assess human economic 
decisionmaking in choosing employment. The more general framework is 
rational choice theory (RCT),40 which assumes that rational people will pursue 
the greatest net benefits.41 Although individuals will therefore seek, other things 
(again) being equal, a higher-paying job over a lower-paying job,42 other things 
will not necessarily be equal when choosing between public-sector and private-
sector employment. RCT studies show that that choice can involve differences 
in workplace values,43 degrees of risk aversion,44 reward preferences,45 and 
personality types.46 However, the extent to which these differences outweigh 
income differentials is inconclusive.47 
Public sector motivation (PSM)—“an individual’s predisposition to respond 
to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and 
organizations”48—is the other relevant framework by which to assess human 
economic decisionmaking in choosing between public-sector and private-sector 
jobs. PSM posits that some individuals will choose to earn less money in the 
 
 39.  See generally John W. Boudreau, Wendy R. Boswell, Timothy A. Judge, & Robert D. Bretz 
Jr., Personality and Cognitive Ability as Predictors of Job Search Among Employed Managers, 54 
PERSONNEL PSYCHOLOGY 25, 44–45 (2001) (discussing the relationship between cognitive ability, pay, 
and search intensity in the job search process); FRANKLIN P. KILPATRICK, MILTON C. CUMMINGS, & 
M. KENT JENNINGS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE IMAGE OF THE FEDERAL SERVICE 23–24 
(1964) (finding that income remains one of the most important factors during the job-making decision); 
Kevin M. Murphy, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Allocation of Talent: Implications for 
Growth (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3530, 1990) (observing that a large 
income disparity may provide a strong incentive to gain employment in the higher paying occupation). 
 40.  See generally Steven L. Green, Rational Choice Theory: An Overview (May 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://business.baylor.edu/steve_green/green1.doc. (providing an 
overview of rational-choice theory for non-specialists). 
 41.  Id. at 4–5. Net benefits mean benefits net of costs. 
 42.  See id. (noting RTC analysis is premised upon the assumption that individuals choose the 
preferred alternative). 
 43.  See, e.g., Phil Hodkinson & Andrew C. Sparkes, Careership: A Sociological Theory of Career 
Decision Making, 18 BRIT J. SOC. EDUC. 29, 33–36 (1997). 
 44.  See, e.g., Don Bellante & Albert N. Link, Are Public Sector Workers More Risk Averse than 
Private Sector Workers?, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 408, 408 (1981) (showing that individuals with a 
high level of risk aversion are more likely to seek employment in the public sector, implying that a 
policy of intersectoral equality of pay for comparable jobs would result in an excess supply of workers 
to the public sector). 
 45.  See, e.g., Hal G. Rainey, Reward Preferences Among Public and Private Managers: In Search of 
the Service Ethic, 16 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 288, passim (1982). 
 46.  See, e.g., Scott C. Douglas & Mark J. Martinko, Exploring the Role of Individual Differences in 
the Prediction of Workplace Aggression, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 547, 547–59 (2001). 
 47.  Cf. Melissa Wong, Elliroma Gardiner, Whitney Lang, & Leah Coulon, Generational 
Differences in Personality and Motivation: Do they Exist and What are the Implications for the 
Workplace?, 23 J. MANAGERIAL PSYCHOL. 878, 878 (2008) (noting no personality differences between 
baby boomers, those of “Generation Y,” and those of “Generation X”). 
 48.  James L. Perry & Lois R. Wise, The Motivational Bases of Public Service, 50 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 367, 368 (1990). 
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public sector in order to work for the public good.49 
Proponents of PSM argue that “effective and well-functioning public 
organizations are populated by individuals with a sense of PSM, that this sense 
actively motivates employees in their work, and, implicitly, that such 
considerations do not motivate employees of private firms.”50 Thus, public-
sector employees can be motivated by factors other than income,51 whereas 
private-sector employees place a higher value on economic rewards than public-
sector employees.52 
The reliability of PSM is not, however, free from doubt. Although some 
studies find that highly educated and more experienced workers are far more 
likely to choose the public sector, offsetting lower wages with rewards arising 
from the characteristics of their jobs,53 other studies find no differences in the 
relative value of money between public-sector and private-sector employees54 
and find that compensation is a decisive factor even for workers with high 
PSM.55 One study even finds that public-sector employees value compensation 
 
 49.  Hal G. Rainey & Paula Steinbauer, Galloping Elephants: Developing Elements of a Theory of 
Effective Government Organizations, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 1, 23 (1999) (referring to a 
“general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a nation or 
humankind”). Other motivations contrast with PSM, such as psychopathic personalities being drawn to 
and thriving in turbulent workplaces, such as investment banks. Clive R. Boddy, The Implications of 
Corporate Psychopaths for Business and Society: An Initial Examination and a Call to Arms, 1 
AUSTRALASIAN J. OF BUS. & BEHAV. SCI. 30, 30–40 (2005) (“Corporate Psychopaths are simply the 
roughly 1% of the population who are certifiably psychopathic and who work in corporations and other 
business organisations. Unlike the criminal psychopaths of popular imagination these people are not 
identifiably insane or suffering from mental delusions but are just ruthless, corporate careerists.”). 
Research has predicted that the incidence of “corporate psychopaths” may be as high as four percent 
on Wall Street. Paul Babiak, Craig S. Neumann, & Robert D. Hare, Corporate Psychopathy: Taking the 
Walk, BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 174, 183 (2010) (cautioning that this number was extrapolated from a small 
sample and may not be representative of the private financial sector). 
 50.  See Patrick Francois, ‘Public Service Motivation’ as an Argument for Government Provision, 78 
J. PUB. ECON., 275, 276 (2000). 
 51.  See Sue A. Frank & Gregory B. Lewis, Government Employees Working Hard or Hardly 
Working?, 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 36, 36–51 (2004); cf. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, Managerial 
Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 654, 655 (2010) 
(arguing that individuals will choose the sector that offers them the highest overall return on ability and 
that income is only a minor part of that return). 
 52.  See, e.g., Ron Cacioppe & Philip Mock, A Comparison of the Quality of Work Experience in 
Government and Private Organizations, 37 HUM. REL. 923, 923 (1984); Hal G. Rainey, Reward 
Preferences Among Public and Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 
207, 210–13 (1982); James R. Rawls, Robert Ullrich, & Oscar T. Nelson, A Comparison of Managers 
Entering or Reentering the Profit and Nonprofit Sectors, 18 ACAD. MGMT. J. 616, 618 (1976) (finding 
managers in the private sector valuing prosperity over helpfulness); Jay R. Schuster, Jerome A. Colletti, 
& L. Knowles, The Relationship Between Perceptions Concerning Magnitudes of Pay and Perceived 
Utility of Pay: Public and Private Organizations Compared, 9 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 
110, 112–118 (1973) (contrasting perceptions about pay between public and private sector employees). 
 53.  Rebecca M. Blank, An Analysis of Workers’ Choice between Employment in the Public and 
Private Sectors, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 211, 211, 219 (1985). 
 54.  Gerald T. Gabris & Gloria Simo, Public Sector Motivation as an Independent Variable 
Affecting Career Decisions, 24 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 33, 33 (1995). 
 55.  Dennis Wittmer, Serving the People or Serving for Pay: Reward Preferences Among 
Government, Hybrid Sector, and Business Managers, 14 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 369, 378–
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more highly than private-sector employees.56 Still another study finds that 
individuals who value income would rather work for the public sector but are 
more likely to be employed in the private sector.57 
Even the notion that happiness is a dominant factor when reaching an 
employment decision is questionable. Recent research shows that individuals 
would rather pursue a higher-paying job making more demands on their time 
than a lower-paying job making only reasonable demands on their time.58 None 
of these studies suggests, even implictly, that PSM should be sufficient to 
overcome the two-to-one income disparity between financial regulators and 
members of the financial industry.59 
Moreover, even if PSM were, arguendo, otherwise generally sufficient to 
overcome that large disparity, the robustness of PSM is questionable in the 
context of persons interested in finance. Most studies on PSM generalize all 
public-sector workers, including so-called “parapublic” jobs in education and 
healthcare.60 However, because the PSM of parapublic-sector employees is 
considerably higher than that of employees in other public-sector jobs,61 those 
studies skew the PSM of public-sector workers outside of education and 
healthcare—and thus of public-sector workers in finance—to appear higher 
than it actually is. 
For persons interested in finance, the robustness of PSM is also questionable 
because those persons, by reason of that very interest, would be expected to 
inherently favor higher financial incomes. Some financial employees are, by 
 
80 (1991). Cf. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., ATTRACTING THE NEXT GENERATION: A LOOK AT 
FEDERAL ENTRY-LEVEL NEW HIRES 33 (2008), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/ 
viewdocs.aspx?docnumber=314895&version=315306&application=ACROBAT (finding that yearly pay 
increases are the most important factor attracting new workers to federal government jobs). 
 56.  Ebrahim A. Maidani, Comparative Study of Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction 
Among Public and Private Sectors, 20 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 441, 441 (1991). 
 57.  Lewis & Frank, supra note 6, at 398. 
 58.  George Lowery, When Opting for Happiness or Income, Many Go for the Cash, CORNELL 
CHRON. (Sept. 16, 2011), http://news.cornell.edu/stories/2011/09/study-finds-we-choose-money-over-
happiness. 
 59.  Further, most research on PSM focuses only on its existence and not on actual job decisions. 
Robert Christensen & Bradley E. Wright, The Effects of Public Service Motivation on Job Choice 
Decisions: Disentangling the Contributions of Person-Organization Fit and Person-Job Fit, 21 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 723, 724 (2011). When assessing the impact of PSM on job decisions, it is 
important to distinguish between public-sector preference and realistic public-sector choices. See Trui 
Steen, Not a Government Monopoly: The Private, Nonprofit, and Voluntary Sectors, in MOTIVATION IN 
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 203, 204 (James L. Perry & Annie Hondeghem eds., 2008) (observing that 
pursuing public-sector work involves not only the choice but also the opportunity to do so). 
 60.  E.g., Lewis & Frank, supra note 6, at 400; James L. Perry, Antecedents of Public Service 
Motivation, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 181, 190–93 (1997); Steen, supra note 59, at 204. 
 61.  Sean T. Lyons, Linda E. Duxbury, & Christopher A. Higgins, A Comparison of the Values and 
Commitment of Private Sector, Public Sector, and Parapublic Sector Employees, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
605, 613 (2006); see Christensen & Wright, supra note 59, at 724 (finding that high-PSM individuals may 
find public-sector jobs stressing welfare, education, and culture to be more attractive than other public-
sector jobs). 
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their very nature, materialistic.62 Many others are taught to “focus on profit and 
the acquisition of wealth” by the very schools in which they receive their 
financial education.63 Moreover, persons interested in finance may be attracted 
to the more innovative opportunities available in the financial industry to create 
financial products, in contrast to financial regulatory jobs in which they would 
primarily monitor the industry. Whatever the reason, empirical evidence 
indicates that the most well-trained financial employees self-select into higher-
paying positions.64 
B. The Difficulty of Regulatory Agencies To Hire Creates an Information 
Asymmetry 
The difficulty of regulatory agencies to hire competitively compared to the 
financial industry creates an information asymmetry between financial 
regulators and members of the financial industry. As shown below, the two-to-
one income disparity drives a significant difference in employee intellect and 
abilities. Those attributes are critical to understanding complex financial 
products and markets. 
Although the general problem of asymmetric information has been debated 
at length by scholars,65 this article’s focus—on information asymmetry resulting 
from differences in intellect and abilities between regulators and the 
regulated—is new. Scholars studying information asymmetries between 
regulators and the regulated have focused in the past almost exclusively on 
information acquisition and product-development lag time.66 Thus, when 
regulators acquire industry information, they do so “only with a lag, and indeed, 
in a rapidly changing environment, the information that they acquire may be of 
only limited relevance to the current situation.”67 
 
 62.  Cf. Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, Pay Preferences and Job Search Decisions: A 
Person-Organization Fit Perspective, 47 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 317, 340–41 (1994) (observing that 
materialistic job seekers “placed greater emphasis on pay level”). 
 63.  Robert A. Giacalone & Donald T. Wargo, The Roots of the Global Financial Crisis Are in Our 
Business Schools, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS EDUC. 147, 158 (2009) (examining the impact of business schools on 
the value systems of their students). 
 64.  See Kuhnen, supra note 34, at 2. 
 65.  See, e.g., Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, Fragile Commitments and the Regulatory 
Process, 9 YALE J. REG. 73, 104 (1992) (noting “the principal-agent relationship between the regulator 
and firm” and the firm’s “advantage of superior information”); Paul L. Joskow & Richard 
Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. REG. 1, 18 (1986) (noting that “the 
regulator’s information is assumed to be inferior to that of the utility’s management” and that “the 
assumption of asymmetric information is quite plausible”). 
 66.  E.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 109 (1982) (arguing that “[t]he 
central problem of the standard-setting process and the most pressing task facing many agencies is 
gathering the information needed to write a sensible standard.”); Cary Coglianese, Richard 
Zeckhauser, & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory 
Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2004); Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The 
Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 
1499 (1993) (arguing that regulators cannot keep up with the development of complex derivatives 
products because of the time lag). 
 67.  David E.M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and Regulation, in PUBLIC 
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That focus is limited to regulators obtaining information and the innate 
advantages the financial industry gains from developing the products to be 
regulated and, hence, not having to acquire information about them through 
third parties. It therefore only indirectly concerns differences in intellect and 
abilities; because industry first develops the products to be regulated, even the 
brightest and most able regulators would be disadvantaged and subject to lag 
time. 
In contrast, this article’s focus on significant differences in intellect and 
abilities goes to the ability of financial regulators to process the information 
once obtained. In order to process that information, regulators must have 
sufficient expertise to understand the financial transactions and their terms, the 
legal and financial obligations of the different parties involved, and the level of 
risk taken on by the regulated firms.68 
There are at least three levels of complexity in financial markets: (1) 
complexities of the assets underlying investment securities traded in financial 
markets and of the means of originating those assets; (2) complexities of those 
investment securities themselves; and (3) complexities of those financial 
markets, which operate as systems.69 Understanding these levels of complexity 
sometimes challenges experts at even the most sophisticated financial firms.70 
Administrative agencies that lack that expertise are even more challenged to 
understand these levels of complexity.71 
 
REGULATION 3, 6 (Elizabeth E. Bailey ed., 1987). See also Edward J. Kane, Hair of the Dog that Bit 
Us: The Insufficiency of New and Improved Capital Requirements 6 (Aug. 11, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at https://www2.bc.edu/edward-kane/ 
HAIR%20OF%20THE%20DOG%20THAT%20BIT%20US.pdf (observing that “[i]n the metagame 
of controlling regulation-induced risk-taking, regulators are outcoached, outgunned, and always playing 
from behind”). 
 68.  Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1897, 1934, 1934 n.167 
(2012); See also id. at 1934 (observing that “[h]iring and retaining knowledgeable and experienced 
personnel is a key component of a regulator’s efforts to manage the flow of information to the extent 
skilled personnel permits regulators to develop independent capacity to evaluate and analyze 
developments in the financial markets”). 
 69.  Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 216–36. 
 70.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. 
REV. 1109, 1113–15 (2008) (arguing that although the disclosure documents describing complex asset-
backed securities generally complied with federal securities law, investors did not fully understand 
those securities or their risks); Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 243 (observing that even the most 
sophisticated investors lost money in the recent financial crisis). 
 71.  Cf. THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: 
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 53–54 (Mar. 10, 2011), available at 2011 WL 830339 
(observing that the SEC’s senior management considers the SEC’s staff analytical capabilities to be 
only average or even below, and attributing that to the SEC’s relatively flat budget and its resulting 
hiring difficulties); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of Financial Regulation: Preliminary 
Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. REG. 253, 273 (2007) (finding that the regulatory 
budget per staff member indicates the staff quality). 
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III 
REGULATORY CONSEQUENCES OF THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
Only two scholars have previously studied this type of information 
asymmetry between financial regulators and industry. Their views on its 
consequences have been dramatic though cursory: 
Following the crises of 1930 through 1933 and 2007 through 2008, regulators have 
been blamed for lax oversight. In retrospect, it is clear that regulators did not have the 
human capital to keep up with the financial industry, and to understand it well enough 
to be able to exert effective regulation. Given the wage premia that we document, it 
was impossible for regulators to attract and retain highly skilled financial workers, 
because [regulatory agencies] could not compete with private-sector wages.72 
Any explanation of consequences, however, should be more nuanced 
because financial regulation by administrative agencies is not merely one-
dimensional but encompasses rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement.73 To 
understand the consequences of the information asymmetry, consider how that 
asymmetry could impact administrative-agency rulemaking, monitoring, and 
enforcement. 
A. Consequences to Rulemaking 
In the context of financial regulation, it has been argued that “[w]here the 
budgets are stronger and the staffing deeper, the agency can write more 
nuanced, tailored rules.”74 The logic of that argument appears to be that the 
regulatory agency thereby has a sufficient number of “trained people” to apply 
the rules.75 That argument, however, can also be supported by observing that 
the better regulators understand financial innovations, the better they can 
promulgate rules to curb harmful innovations.76 Absent a clear understanding, 
 
 
 72.  Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 
1909–2006, at 31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14644, 2009) (citations omitted). 
Philippon and Reshef thus argue that the income disparity “provides an explanation for regulatory 
failures.” Id. Other scholars have not studied but merely alluded to an information asymmetry between 
financial regulators and industry due to intellect. See, e.g., Bond & Glode, supra note 32, at 2540 
(observing a criticism that, “bluntly put, financial regulators are not as smart as the bankers and traders 
they are charged with overseeing.”). 
 73.  Professor Eric Pan divides what I call “monitoring” into two functions: “supervision” and 
“certification.” Pan, supra note 68, at 1909. He defines “supervision” as a regulator’s “monitoring, 
assessment, and guidance of an entity’s efforts to meet its regulatory obligations.” Id. at 1911. He 
defines “certification” as “the substantive evaluation and approval of products or services by the 
regulator,” such as licensing and registration. Id. at 1914. My term “monitoring” includes these 
functions other than approval of financial products or services. Financial regulation in the United States 
does not currently enable regulators to approve or disapprove financial products per se, other than by 
issuing administrative rules or regulations governing those products—which would be included in the 
category of rulemaking. 
 74.  Howell E. Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: 
Resource-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 235 (2009). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Cf. id. (observing that “a higher budget and more staffing facilitate the regulatory agency 
being able to write, revise, and enforce better, more sophisticated rules”). 
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regulators might not only fail to promulgate adequate rules; they also might 
misinterpret the innovations and promulgate rules that are harmful.77 
The tendency to promulgate harmful rules might be heightened if regulators 
lack good judgment. In that context, it might be interesting to explore whether 
the income disparity creates another type of “information” asymmetry: one in 
which some regulators have good technical intellect but lack good judgment. In 
my experience, the financial industry strives to hire, and pays dearly for, 
employees who have both good technical intellect and good judgment. 
Administrative agencies might well seek to hire at least some employees with 
good technical intellect; but the pool of those employees who also have good 
judgment and are willing to work for low government pay will be small. That 
might help to explain why many of the bright financial regulators I have met 
tend to be very narrow and rigid, seeing problems in black and white and often 
lacking the flexibility to try to see others’ perspectives. 
B. Consequences to Monitoring 
As explained, this information asymmetry can prevent regulators from fully 
understanding financial innovations and products.78 Absent that understanding, 
they might fail to promulgate adequate rules and might even promulgate 
harmful rules.79 That absence may also have monitoring consequences—that 
regulators will be unable to effectively monitor financial innovations and 
products. Professor Pan, for example, argues that with additional resources 
administrative agencies can “hire better skilled and more experienced 
personnel” who can “review more carefully new [financial] products and 
services . . . .”80 
That is not to say that reducing the income disparity between regulators and 
industry could eliminate information-based market failures. Not only regulators 
but also industry participants—including rating agencies, monoline insurance 
companies, and even the most sophisticated and largest institutional investors—
either missed or did not adequately take into account early warning signs of the 
recent financial crisis.81 Moreover, human nature might lead some regulators to 
overrely on information provided by financial firms that offer, or at least 
 
 
 77.  Cf. Hu, supra note 66, at 1508 (arguing that regulators who succeed in gaining current industry 
information on financial innovation may not be sophisticated enough to interpret and thus may 
misinterpret that information). 
 78.  See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text. 
 79.  See supra text accompanying note 77. 
 80.  Pan, supra note 68, at 1932. He also observes that additional resources would enable financial 
regulators to “invest in more sophisticated information processing and surveillance systems . . . .” Id. 
 81.  See Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 243. In many cases, moreover, information failures were caused 
not by information asymmetry but by mutual misinformation: by retaining residual risk portions of 
certain complex securitization products they were selling, underwriters may actually have fostered false 
investor confidence, contributing to the recent financial crisis. See id. at 241–42 (discussing mutual 
misinformation). 
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purport to offer, transparency, and with which the regulators have developed 
longstanding relationships. Nonetheless, reducing the income disparity should 
at least help to reduce the information asymmetry and its consequences. 
 
C. Consequences to Enforcement 
Because of the sheer number of regulatory personnel needed to pursue 
enforcement actions, enforcement—more than rulemaking and monitoring—
turns as much on the quantity as on the quality of regulators. Professor Pan, for 
example, argues that additional resources will also enable administrative 
agencies to hire personnel who can “pursue more enforcement actions.”82 
Professors Jackson and Roe similarly argue that “more resources [in the form 
of “high budgets and staffing”] facilitate regulatory investigations, [thereby] 
making it easier for [an] agency to bring enforcement actions . . . .”83 
Nonetheless, “much public enforcement is done informally” by regulators, 
such as through “a regulator’s raised eyebrow.”84 “[I]nformal public 
enforcement” of this type “requires highly skilled staffers.”85 Furthermore, 
greater regulatory expertise should enable administrators to better enforce 
highly sophisticated rules and regulations.86 
In summary, the two-to-one income disparity between the financial industry 
and its regulators creates an information asymmetry that can cause regulatory 
failures in rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. That helps to explain why 
financial regulation is so often inadequate. Next consider how the information 
asymmetry could be mitigated. 
IV 
ADDRESSING THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
The information asymmetry could be addressed directly by reducing the 
information disparity. It also could be addressed indirectly. First, consider the 
direct approach. 
A. Reducing The Income Disparity 
The information asymmetry that results from the income disparity between 
regulators and the financial industry could be mitigated most directly by 
reducing this disparity. That could be done in at least two ways: by increasing 
regulators’ compensation, and by limiting financial-industry compensation. 
 
 82.  Pan, supra note 68, at 1932. 
 83.  Jackson & Roe, supra note 74, at 235. 
 84.  Id. (referring to this type of informal enforcement in England and to informal “administrative 
guidance” in Japan). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Cf. id. (observing that a “higher budget and more staffing” should “facilitate the regulatory 
agency being able to . . . enforce . . . more sophisticated rules”). 
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1. Increasing Regulators’ Compensation 
In an ideal universe, the income disparity would be addressed directly by 
increasing regulators’ compensation. The ability of government to do this is, of 
course, highly subject to political considerations. In the United States, that 
would depend not only on increasing the budgets of financial regulatory 
agencies but also on further exempting employees of those agencies from the 
general schedule and other applicable per-person-pay limitations.87 
Some scholars argue that attracting more able workers into the public sector 
(whether through increasing income or otherwise) would be inefficient, 
suggesting that the return on talent is higher in the private sector.88 That may or 
may not generally be true, but it is unlikely to be true for financial regulation so 
long as regulators suffer from an information asymmetry that can prevent them 
from effectively monitoring and regulating financial innovations that might 
create systemic externalities. 
It therefore ought to be efficient to increase regulators’ compensation as 
needed to reduce that information asymmetry. That raises the question, though, 
of what level of increase is needed. Although not a controlled experiment, the 
experience of Singapore may be instructive. Singapore pays its government 
regulators89 incomes that match or exceed those of comparable private-sector 
workers.90 Its officials have publicly stated that pay should not be a reason not 
to join, or to leave, a Singaporean regulatory agency.91 Thus, the salaries for 
employees of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), the principal 
Singaporean supervisor and regulator of the financial industry, is pegged to 
financial-industry salaries.92 This appears to be done by reviewing the top 
salaries of a range of financial professionals and by calculating an average 
 
 87.  Cf. supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 88.  Cf. Francesca Barigozzi, Nadia Burani & Davide Raggi, The Lemons Problem in a Labor 
Market with Intrinsic Motivation: When Higher Salaries Pay Worse Workers, (Quaderni DSE Working 
Paper No. 883, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271987 (arguing 
that when workers are motivated, inefficiencies due to adverse selection are mitigated). 
 89.  Some suggest this pay parity applies not to all Singaporean government regulators but just to 
ministers and high level officers. Sajid Anwar & Choon Yin Sam, Private Sector Corporate Governance 
and the Singaporean Government-Linked Corporations, 7 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV. 66, 80 (2006) (citing 
Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and Cures 573 (IMF Working 
Paper No. WP/98/63, 1998)). 
 90.  Doha Abdelhamid & Laila El Baradei, Reforming the Pay System for Government Employees 
in Egypt 26 (Working Paper No. 151, 2009). In the final published version of this paper, however, the 
part on Singapore was omitted. See Doha Abdelhamid & Laila El Baradei, Reforming the Pay System 
for Government Employees in Egypt, 11 INT’L PUB. MGMT. REV., no. 3, 2010, available at 
http://www1.imp.unisg.ch/org/idt/ipmr.nsf/. 
 91.  See Seth Mydans, Singapore Announces 60 Percent Pay Raise for Ministers, N.Y. TIMES, April 
9, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/asia/09iht-sing.3.5200498.html?_r=0 (quoting 
Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean). 
 92.  MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, SINGAPORE: DETAILED 
ASSESSMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION—IOSCO OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 48–49 (Dec. 2013), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr13344.pdf. 
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income to be applied to financial regulators.93 
The International Monetary Fund believes that the resulting high salaries 
have enabled MAS not only to attract and retain regulatory staff with excellent 
qualifications and expertise94 but also to achieve a high degree of compliance 
with the principles of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO).95 The resulting effectiveness of Singapore’s regulatory system is 
believed to have helped establish Singapore as a regional financial center.96 
Singapore thus appears to be a successful example of directly addressing the 
income disparity, and resulting information asymmetry, by increasing 
regulators’ compensation. But whether the Singaporean attempt at income 
parity could be viable in other countries, including the United States, is unclear. 
Even given the political will to achieve that parity, the financial industry would 
be motivated and—so long as finance is highly profitable—able to match and 
exceed any public-sector raises that would aim to draw away significant talent. 
Singapore’s success to the contrary may be bound up with a regulatory 
economy-of-scale or another country-specific explanation. That would help to 
explain the puzzling evidence suggesting that, notwithstanding Singapore’s 
income parity between financial regulators and industry, its per-person 
regulatory costs are still slightly lower than those of the United States.97 
Finally, a variant on increasing regulators’ compensation would be to pay 
regulators based on their performance. Professors Henderson and Tung, for 
example, partly blame the lack of incentive, which performance-based pay 
could help create, for the failure of bank examiners to act aggressively to 
prevent excessive risk during the recent financial crisis.98 They argue that 
compensating bank examiners based on performance would help to reduce 
future bank failures.99 
Performance-based pay for regulators is an interesting idea, but whether it 
would work in practice is yet to be seen—although one could view bonuses paid 
to regulators as a form of performance-based pay.100 Henderson and Tung agree 
 
 93.  Abdelhamid & Baradei, supra note 90, at 26. 
 94.  MONETARY & CAPITAL MKTS. DEP’T, INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 92, at 48. 
 95.  See id. at 5. 
 96.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Role of the State in Financial Markets, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
WORLD BANK ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1993: SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW AND THE WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 19, 36 (1993). 
 97.  See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 71, at 291 (finding no material difference between the per-person 
costs of U.S. and Singaporean financial regulators, where the per-person cost of financial regulators 
was, at the time of his research, $146,515 in Singapore, $154,840 in the United States, and $175,644 in 
Ireland). 
 98.  See M. Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for Regulator Performance, 85 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1003, 1003 (2012). 
 99.  Id. (arguing that the performance-based pay should be a “debt-heavy mix of phantom bank 
debt and equity, as well as a separate bonus linked to the timing of the decision to take over a bank”). 
 100.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text (observing that administrative agencies pay, albeit 
rarely, limited bonuses to regulators). See also Henderson & Tung, supra note 98, at 1013 (observing 
that “[b]ank regulatory agencies have begun using bonuses ostensibly tied to performance”). 
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that the “key” to this method’s success would be “finding metrics for measuring 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ performance in government, and deploying them in ways that 
will not make things worse.”101 They argue that this method should be feasible, 
at least for compensating bank examiners.102 Even if they are correct, however, 
the rapid rise of disintermediation and shadow banking—in which nonbanking 
firms and financial markets increasingly replace banks as the source of financial 
intermediation103—is diminishing the importance of the bank examiner’s job in 
the overall task of financial regulation.104 
 
2. Limiting Financial Industry Compensation 
A further way to mitigate the income disparity and, hence, the information 
asymmetry might be to legally limit compensation in the financial industry. A 
populist movement towards limiting financial-industry compensation has gained 
momentum in recent years, as a reaction (among other things) to the huge 
bonuses paid to senior financial executives while shareholders of their firms 
faced losses.105 
Limiting financial industry compensation might, however, have unintended 
consequences: “Experience has [] found that direct government control of pay 
creates a host of perverse and unintended consequences.”106 Furthermore, at 
least in the United States, there is a strong historical bias in favor of free 
markets and against government restriction of private-sector compensation. 
And even if there otherwise is political will to impose such restrictions, it might 
not extend to restrictions beyond the highest-paid executives;107 and those 
executives are not the ones for whom the income disparity creates the most 
troublesome information asymmetry.108 
 
 101.  Henderson & Tung, supra note 98, at 1010. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking 
Assumptions About Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2014) (arguing that shadow 
banking’s transformation of the financial industry calls for redesigning limited liability in the corporate 
governance context). 
 104.  In 2011, the size of the shadow-banking system was estimated at $67 trillion worldwide. FIN. 
STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 3 (2012); cf. ZOLTAN POZSAR ET 
AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 458: SHADOW BANKING 4–5 
(2010) (arguing that shadow bank financing appears to dwarf traditional bank financing). 
 105.  See, e.g., Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/31/business/31pay.html 
(discussing criticism aimed at banker’s compensation). 
 106.  Martin Wolf, Why and How Should We Regulate Pay in the Financial Sector?, in THE FUTURE 
OF FINANCE AND THE THEORY THAT UNDERPINS IT 235, 238 (2010), available at 
http://harr123et.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/futureoffinance-chapter91.pdf. 
 107.  Cf. supra note 105 and accompanying text (observing that the populist backlash concerns huge 
bonuses paid to senior financial executives). 
 108.  Cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Conflicts and Financial Collapse: The Problem of Secondary-
Management Agency Costs, 26 YALE J. REG. 457, 458–59 (2009) (observing that secondary managers 
structure, sell, and invest in financial market securities on behalf of their firms). 
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B. Other Measures 
One could also consider other measures that do not address the income 
disparity per se but that nonetheless might help reduce the information 
asymmetry or its consequences. These measures could include increasing the 
nonmonetary attraction of public-sector regulatory jobs, reducing the 
information asymmetry by blunt force, and accepting the information 
asymmetry and regulating to mitigate its consequences. 
1. Increasing the Nonmonetary Attraction of Public-Sector Regulatory Jobs 
The nonmonetary attraction of public-sector regulatory jobs could be 
increased, at least in theory, by making those jobs more challenging and by 
increasing regulatory prestige.109 Although “pay can be an important factor in 
determining person-job fit as individuals have financial needs that they expect 
their jobs to help satisfy,” individuals “often have to make [employment] 
decisions that require weighing trade-offs between financial rewards and other 
desired job characteristics.”110 
To some extent, the European training of judges might provide a model for 
increasing regulatory prestige. In continental Europe, “the tendency is to 
appoint young, easily trainable law graduates willing to accept a prestigious and 
stable career, if not one as well paid as that of a highly successful attorney or 
consultant.”111 French judges, for example, are recruited nationally through 
competitive examinations to attend the National School for the Judiciary 
(ENM), which prepares them for a lifetime civil-service career.112 
2. Reducing the Information Asymmetry by Blunt Force 
There are several ways that the information asymmetry could be reduced by 
blunt force, including by standardizing financial products, by increasing 
specialization among regulators, and by paying third-party experts to try to 
reduce the asymmetry. The Dodd–Frank Act effectively utilizes the first 
approach, for example, by requiring many derivatives transactions to be cleared 
through clearinghouses,113 which generally require a high degree of 
standardization in the derivatives that they clear.114 
But standardization can backfire. Dodd–Frank’s clearinghouse requirement 
 
 109.  Cf. Gabris & Simo, supra note 54, at 49 (arguing that if public-sector regulatory jobs were 
made more challenging and monetarily appealing, they would draw good recruits). The italicized 
language undercuts their argument as applied to this article, however. 
 110.  Christensen & Wright, supra note 59, at 728. 
 111.  Luis Muniz-Arguelles & Migdalia Fraticelli-Torres, Selection and Training of Judges in Spain, 
France, West Germany, and England, 8 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985). 
 112.  Id. at 5 n.14, 11. 
 113.  Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 
723(a)(3) (2010). 
 114.  This can become a little circular, though, because Dodd–Frank includes an exception for 
derivatives that a clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. See id. (requiring clearing through a 
clearinghouse “if the swap is required to be cleared”). 
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might inadvertently increase systemic risk by concentrating derivatives 
exposure at the clearinghouse level.115 And the overall economic impact of 
standardization is unclear because “standardization can stifle innovation and 
interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when 
firms craft financial products tailored to the particular needs and risk 
preferences of investors.”116 
An approach similar to standardization would be to regulate financial 
innovation so heavily that industry would not benefit from having more 
qualified workers and thus would pay them less. Research has found “a very 
tight link between deregulation and human capital in the financial sector.”117 
Thus, “regulation inhibits the ability to exploit the creativity and innovation of 
educated and skilled workers” in the financial industry, whereas deregulation 
“unleashes creativity and innovation and increases demand” for those 
workers.118 This approach would therefore also be risky because discouraging 
innovation and creativity could have myriad adverse and unanticipated 
consequences. 
Another possible way to try to reduce the information asymmetry would be 
to increase regulatory specialization. Specialization might lead to adverse 
consequences, however, potentially making the regulators’ focus so narrow that, 
over time, they will miss the dynamically changing bigger picture; or making 
regulators’ jobs less interesting, thereby further increasing the information 
asymmetry by discouraging workers to apply for regulatory positions. 
The limited experience with regulatory specialization has shown mixed 
results, as exemplified by the World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment 
Program (FSAP). In 1995, the World Bank formed a team of financial 
specialists to try to better diagnose problems within financial systems.119 At the 
outset, the team was able to synergistically capitalize on the knowledge added 
by each individual specialist.120 Over time, however, the specialists focused 
increasingly on their specific subdisciplines.121 
Yet another approach would be to pay third-party experts to try to reduce 
the information asymmetry. But the widely publicized failure of credit-rating 
agencies to accurately rate mortgage-backed securities, and concerns that such 
 
 115.  See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytical 
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1395 (2011) (observing that “central clearing merely shifts 
counterparty risk to a clearinghouse, reducing that risk only to the extent that clearinghouses can 
manage risk better or are more creditworthy than individual firms”). 
 116.  Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 815, 820 (2012). 
 117.  Philippon & Reshef, supra note 72, at 4. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Gerard Caprio, Jr., Financial Regulation in a Changing World: Lessons from the Recent Crisis 6 
(The Inst. for Int’l Integration Studies, Discussion Paper No. 308, 2009), available at 
https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp308.pdf. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. 
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failure was a causal factor in the financial crisis, raise questions as to the 
efficacy—or at least of the political acceptability—of this type of approach.122 
3. Accepting the Information Asymmetry and Regulating To Mitigate its 
Consequences 
Finally, another possible response would be to accept the reality of the 
income disparity, and hence the resulting information asymmetry, and to 
regulate in a way that mitigates its consequences. The main consequence of the 
information asymmetry is that financial regulation will be insufficient to prevent 
all financial failures. Professor Anabtawi and I have argued that ex ante 
(preventative) financial regulation is, for various reasons, inherently insufficient 
to prevent all financial failures, and thus financial failures are inevitable.123 
Therefore, any financial regulatory strategy should also include ex post 
(ameliorative) regulation.124 Such regulation could include, for example, 
government-imposed financial safety nets and mechanisms to disrupt the 
transmission of systemic failure.125 That same strategy should help to address 
financial failures that result from the information asymmetry. 
V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The extraordinary income disparity between financial regulators and their 
industry counterparts differentiates financial regulation from other forms of 
regulation. At each level, financial-industry employees make at least twice as 
much as financial regulators (in contrast to nonfinancial industry employees, 
who make on average only twenty-five percent more than their regulatory 
counterparts).126 This huge income disparity undermines the ability of financial 
regulatory agencies to hire competitively, in turn driving a significant difference 
in employee intellect and abilities. 
These attributes are especially critical, however, in order to understand 
increasingly complex financial products and markets. The resulting information 
asymmetry between financial regulators and industry can lead to regulatory 
 
 122.  See, e.g., Sophia Grene, Big Three Credit Rating Agencies Under Fire, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 
4, 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4140e388-cfc1-11e3-9b2b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3K23McdO2 
(discussing the perceived culpability of credit-rating agencies in the recent financial crisis). 
 123.  Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the 
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75, 93–96, 130–31 (2013). 
 124.  Id. at 130–31 (explaining why this two-pronged regulatory approach is needed). 
 125.  Id. at 102–22. 
 126.  This comparison is necessarily imprecise because it uses general-industry data to approximate 
nonfinancial industry data. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (comparing federal government 
and private-sector pay for similar jobs). Among other sources of imprecision, the general-industry data 
already include, and thus the income disparity based on those data is increased by, financial-sector data. 
Accordingly, the actual income disparity between nonfinancial industry employees and nonfinancial 
regulatory employees is probably smaller than twenty-five percent. And that income disparity (between 
nonfinancial industry employees and nonfinancial regulatory employees) may be even smaller still for 
the reasons discussed above. See supra note 6. 
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failures at all levels, including rulemaking, monitoring, and enforcement. These 
failures help to explain why financial regulation is so often inadequate.127 
Reducing the income disparity would be a politically challenging, if not 
impossible, task. Even if the government were to attempt to increase the 
incomes of financial regulators to private-sector levels, the financial industry 
would be motivated—and because it is highly profitable, it may well (at least 
outside Singapore128) be able—to match and exceed any income increases that 
were to draw away significant talent. Another potential response is to focus 
more resources on ex post financial regulation, thereby mitigating the 
consequences of financial failure. That approach recognizes that, for a range of 
reasons, including the income disparity, financial failures are inevitable. There 
are other potential responses to attempt to correct regulatory failures resulting 
from the income disparity (and resulting information asymmetry), but they are 
even more “second best.” 
This article’s focus is new. Although other scholars have studied information 
asymmetries between regulators and the regulated, they have focused almost 
exclusively on information acquisition and product-development lag time. That 
focus is limited to regulators obtaining information. In contrast, this article 
focuses on the information asymmetry that results from differences in intellect 
and abilities between regulators and the regulated. That focus goes not to 
obtaining information; instead, it goes to the ability of financial regulators to 
process the information once obtained. 
 
 
 127.  There are of course other possible explanations of why financial regulation is so often 
inadequate, including other income-related explanations. Professor White suggests, for example, that 
“if high returns in the financial industry are associated with risk-taking[,] higher wages will attract more 
risk-takers to the financial industry and that may make potential problems in the industry worse.” E-
mail from Eugene N. White, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, to the author (Feb. 9, 2014) 
(on file with author). Professor Lastra and others have written of the problem of bonuses based on 
short-term performance, which can motivate bankers to engage in excessively risky transactions. See, 
e.g., Luis Garicano & Rosa M. Lastra, Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles, 
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 597, 618 (2010). And I have written about conflicts of interest resulting from short-
term compensation of secondary managers of financial firms. See Schwarcz, supra note 108, passim. 
 128.  See supra text accompanying notes 97–98. 
